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FOREWORD
LAWRENCE LESSIG*
Early in his film, An Inconvenient Truth,1 Al Gore identifies an assumption
that, if believed, leads most to think that “global warming” cannot really be a
problem. The assumption is that humans cannot possibly affect something as
massive as the environment of the globe. We are too small. We cannot see how
our individual actions could ever aggregate to alter anything more than a
defined locale. Sure, Los Angeles might suffer smog produced by too many
automobiles. But look at a map. It is just a tiny spec on the scale of the whole
world. And there is tons of empty space between cities as big as Los Angeles.
Yet when this assumption of locality is shown to be false—as it quickly is
through Gore’s careful teaching—then we cannot help but look differently at
the issues surrounding global warming. Once we see the truth about our
responsibility for at least part of the change in world climate, we cannot help
but at least think about how we might intervene differently.
About a decade ago, a small number of scholars began to focus our
attention on a point parallel to Gore’s. Their point was not about the physical
environment. It was instead about the cultural environment. Most could not see
how a traditionally tiny corner of the law called “intellectual property” could
significantly affect culture and the spread of knowledge. For most, such law was
merely “technical.”2 But like Gore’s point about man’s effect on global
warming, these scholars argued that, whether or not “technical,” this law was in
fact producing an increasingly significant, and largely unintended, effect on the
growth and spread of culture and knowledge. That effect was, moreover,
general, rather than limited to the small range of commercial culture that the
law historically had concerned itself with. Its consequence would be, these
scholars argued, to constrain radically important cultural and scientific
progress—at least unless we reformed the structure and reach of the law
regulating information. The aim of these scholars was thus to begin what has
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now become a decade-long conversation about how such structures of cultural
and scientific regulation might be reformed.
These scholars were many—Pam Samuelson, Jessica Litman, Rosemary
Coombes, Peter Jaszi, and perhaps first in influence, L. Ray Patterson. But their
common purpose was stated early on and, in my view, most effectively by James
Boyle’s Shamans, Software, and Spleens.3 In a brilliant, compelling, and
comprehensive review, Boyle offered an understanding of the law regulating
information and its complicated, and uncomfortable, relationship to a dominant
discourse of American law: economics. There was, Boyle argued, a complex,
and for most of us, counterintuitive relationship between the ideals of economic
efficiency and information regulation. Information law was increasingly missing
that relationship. And unless we as a political culture became more aware of
this relationship, we were likely to allow trends in information law to impair
some of the most important aspects of our knowledge economy. Intellectual
property had been born as author-centric, Boyle argued.4 That author-centric
regime, however, was increasingly difficult to justify distributionally, and it was
increasingly “economically irrational.”5 The “romantic author” that defined
historically the contours of information policy was now queering information
policy in ways that weakened “both efficiency and justice.”6 Boyle thus
argued—powerfully, in my view—for a political movement that might
understand and reform this originally insignificant policy now spinning out of
hand.
In the decade since Boyle’s book first appeared, the understanding he
pushed has matured into what we should now call the culturalenvironmentalism movement.7 For, like the global environment, more now see
how relatively specific choices about how information gets regulated have
radical effects upon the health and diversity of an information ecology. And just
as we need to account for the global effects of our decision to heat with coal, or
drive with oil, so too we need to account for the global cultural effects of the
radical increase in regulation that marks information law. The claim is not for
anarchy. Information environments, like physical environments, need
regulation. None doubt that some regulation is good. But just because some is
good, it does not follow that more is better. Or even if more is better for some
purposes, it is not necessarily better for the spread of knowledge or the progress
of culture.
It was my idea to take the occasion of Shamans’s tenth anniversary to
organize a conference that would reflect upon both Boyle’s work and the work
left to be done. The conference was not intended as a festschrift: Boyle is a

3. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
4. Id. at x.
5. Id. at 119.
6. Id. at x.
7. This term Boyle coined just after his book was published. See Boyle, supra note 2.
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young and vital scholar; his festschrift will not be planned for many years to
come. But because his work so effectively framed a moment in the history of
what we now recognize as the “cultural environmentalism movement,” my hope
was that he would allow us the opportunity to use his work to frame the next
stages as well.
This took some persuading. Boyle is not the sort to exaggerate his place; he
is quick to signal the works of others that make similar points to his and that
build upon his own in ways that have improved his work. The idea of a
conference organized around a book he wrote a decade ago seemed, to him at
least, inappropriately attentive. Whatever place Shamans had in the debate a
decade ago, Boyle insisted that others had added to the debate in ways that
made it “peculiar” to focus on his early work.
I am very happy, however, that in the end he let us organize our conference
around the inspirations that his book provided. As our aim was the progress of
this particular approach to cultural environmentalism, our attention was on
young scholars just beginning their work in a field that Boyle helped frame. We
asked these scholars to write papers for the next generation, building upon
Boyle’s book, but not in any way limited by the scope or reach of the book. And
then we asked some leading scholars of the day to comment upon their work.
Thus, the new would be telling us what would be new, with a bit of reflection
from those not quite as new.
The result is much more than I hoped. Shamans focused on a wider range of
information-policy questions than is currently our focus today (we do not worry
too much about the law of blackmail just now, and we do not worry enough
about the law governing genetic engineering). Likewise, the papers in this
volume move far beyond the particular issues that are our focus today. The
volume thus suggests a direction for research, at least as some prominent young
scholars see it today. And just as Shamans helped frame a discourse understood
by just a few a decade ago, and which has now become perhaps the most
important debate in public law, this symposium will help frame the next
generation of that debate.

